Previous approaches to investigating strategic social interaction in game theory have predominantly used games with clearly-dened turns and limited choices. However, most real-world social behaviors involve
dynamic, coevolving decisions by interacting agents, which pose challenges for creating tractable models of behavior. Here, using a competitive game in which human participants control the dynamics of an on-screen avatar against either another human or a computer opponent, we show that it is possible to quantify the dynamic coupling between agents using nonparametric models. We use Gaussian Processes to model the joint distributions of players' actions and identities (human or computer) as a function of game state. Borrowing from a reinforcement learning framework, we successfully approximated both the policy and the value functions used by each human player in this competitive context. This approach oers a natural set of metrics for facilitating analysis at multiple timescales and suggests new classes of tractable paradigms for assessing human behavior.
Over the last fteen years, game theory has been foundational in establishing cognitive and biological mechanisms of strategic decision making [14] . Paradigms like Matching Pennies, the Trust/Ultimatum Games, and Prisoner's Dilemma have used simple choices in highly standardized contexts to rigorously characterize the psychological processes underlying social concepts such as trust, altruism, and inequity aversion. The growing adoption of paradigms from game theory has yielded key insights into social decision-making in humans [48] and animals [911] . These game theory paradigms draw upon a vast literature detailing how rational players would behave [1, 4, 1214 ], yet studies comparing human behavior to these normative solutions have found that humans often violate rational predictions [1, 4, 12, 15] .
While a central aim of game theory is to describe how people should make decisions, describing how humans actually make decisions is of particular interest to social scientists. Indeed, many of the features that have made game theory paradigms analytically attractivediscrete choices, turn-taking, known payoutsare abstractions away from real-world social interactions.
For instance, when buyers haggle over the price of a good, they respond to one another in real time, using a combination of nonverbal cues, strategic planning, perspective taking, and value judgment. Their continuous, dynamic interaction thus forms a challenge to any computational framework for the study of social decisions [4, 16, 17] . Moreover, while game theory has proven highly successful in analyzing various sorts of equilibria players might settle into, considerably less is known about the processes by which these equilibria are reached [18, 19] . As a result, it is desirable to develop ana-lytical tools capable of quantifying strategic dynamics while maintaining the mathematical rigor that has made game theory such a productive framework.
Here, we introduce a computational modeling framework that borrows heavily from recent advances in reinforcement learning [2027] and nonparametric Bayesian modeling [2830] to capture these social dynamics. Our approach produces models of behavior that are both exible enough to capture the variability present in a continuously evolving strategic setting and powerful enough to quantify strategic dierences across participants, trials, and even individual moments within trials. Our testbed for these ideas is a competitive task in which human participants played against both a human opponent and a computer opponent in a real-time, movement-based game. This paradigm generates a rich complexity in individuals' behavior that can be succinctly described by individualized, instantaneous policy and value functions, facilitating analysis at multiple timescales of interest. This approach serves to quantify complex interactions between multiple agents in a parsimonious manner and so suggests new classes of tractable paradigms for studying human behavior and strategic decision making.
Results

Penalty Shot Task
We adapted a zero-sum dynamic control task, inspired by a penalty shot in hockey [17] . The task was viewed on a computer screen and played by two players: an experimental participant (n = 82) who controlled an on-screen circle, or puck, and another long-term participant who controlled an onscreen bar, acting as the goalie. Hereafter, we will refer to these players as the participant and the opponent, respectively. The puck began each trial at the left of the screen and moved rightward at a constant horizontal speed.
The task of the participant was to score by crossing a goal line located at the right end of the screen behind the opponent. The opponent's task was to block the puck from reaching the goal line. Each player moved his or her avatar using a joystick. Both players were only able to control the vertical velocities of their respective avatars, though the puck and bar had distinct game physics (see Methods and Supplement Methods 1). See Figure 1C ) demonstrated highly stereotyped play, with most trials exhibiting a down-up-guess approach. By contrast, Participant 4's ( Figure 1D ) trajectories were dispersed throughout the screen, perhaps resulting in less predictable play. Participants also experienced highly variable win rates, which ranged from 43-76% (against human: 34-83%; computer 42-73%).
Gaussian Process Models
Our observed data for each trial were movement trajectories for the puck and the bar, each spanning approximately 1.5 seconds (9496 discrete time points). While it is possible to model these time series directly [17] , we observed that for many participants, puck trajectories could be characterized as comprising a series of straight-line segments of maximal or near-maximal velocity separated by change points (Fig 2A) . That is, we could redene the decision available to the participant at each moment as whether or not to switch direction. This transforms a time series modeling problem into a more tractable change point prediction problem, for which our predictors are a small number of game state variables.
Viewed through the lens of reinforcement learning, the decision of whether to switch direction at time t is an action, a t , and the probability of this action given a state of the world s t is given by the policy function: Π(a t , s t , ω) = p(a t |s t , ω), where we let s t denote a vector of predictors at each time point and ω is a binary variable indicating the opponent's identity (computer = 0, human = 1) [20] . In principle, both states and actions can be continuous, though in practice, they are often discretized [20, 34] . In our case, we dene the action space as a single binary variable, with 1 indicating a change in direction and a 0 indicating continuation along the current trajectory. However, the state s remains continuous and includes a total of 7 predictor variables: the x and y positions of the puck, the y position of the bar, their respective vertical velocities, the time since the occurrence of the last change point (normalized to 1 by dividing by total trial length), and an opponent experience variable that ranged from 0 (rst trial) to 1 (last trial)
that was specic to each opponent and reected potential strategic adaptation over the course of the experiment. Finally, we simplify our notation, dening π(s t , ω) = p(a t = 1|s t , ω). Because our input space is of moderate dimension, a model for π(s, ω) will be a continuous function of s instead of a large matrix, as it would be for a model with a discrete state space. Our contribution is to show that nonparametric methods allow us to address the challenge of modeling π using only sparsely sampled data.
Our decision to model change point probabilities as a function only of states and opponents means that the data at each time are independent of each other given these variables. Thus, our approach is also equivalent to a binary classication problem. Binary classication is well-studied, with many methods available, including logistic regression, support vector machines, and neural networks [35] . Our selection of model was guided by three A Gaussian Process (GP) is a distribution over functions. GPs are widely used in spatial and time series modeling for their combination of exibility and ability to generalize from even modest data [28, 36] . In the same way that a sample from a normal distribution is a real number and a sample from a Bernoulli distribution is a binary variable, a sample from a GP is an entire function (e.g., a univariate time series (d = 1) or spatial density (d = 2)). Gaussian Processes have the advantage of providing a principled, Bayesian measure of uncertainty over functions while remaining resistant to overtting and generalizing to unseen data [28] . They are also equivalent to single-layer, fully-connected, innitely wide neural networks, and have been shown to outperform neural networks in avoiding overtting on small to moderate datasets [3739] . Moreover, they are the method of choice when modeling time courses based on sparse or irregularly-sampled data [40, 41] .
Thus, GPs oer competitive modeling performance with the added benets of uncertainty estimation and dierentiability.
More formally, a GP f is dened by a mean function m(x) (usually assumed to be 0 a priori ) and a covariance function k(x, x ) that denes the correlation between values of f at dierent input points [28] :
By denition, the joint distribution of the observed data set
As stated above, we chose to model players' policies via a GP classication model that attempted to predict an upcoming change in the puck's direction from the current state s and opponent identity ω. Following standard techniques [28, 42] , we assumed that binary change point observations a i were Bernoulli distributed according to the policy π(s, ω) and that the policy itself was related to an underlying GP:
where Φ −1 is the inverse cumulative normal distribution (also called the probit or quantile function) and GP(0, k) is a GP prior on f with mean 0 and kernel function k. Because we assume that f is a smooth function of its inputs, we choose the common radial basis function (RBF) kernel [28] :
with i indexing input variables and σ i and λ i hyperparameters setting the overall magnitude of the covariance and the length scale of correlations along each dimension, respectively. Here, x includes both s and ω. Even though ω is a discrete parameter, we approximate it as a continuous variable, as is often done in Bayesian modeling using GPs [43] . We found that our GP classication model accurately captured the diverse patterns present in participants' data (Fig 2A,B) . That is, the model had a higher probability of predicting a change point in regions of the screen where change points actually occurred. This is a direct result both of the nonparametric nature of the GPthe model adapts its complexity to the dataas well as the smoothing eects of the prior. Held-out test data from each participant yielded a median area under the curve (AUC) score of 94% ( Fig 2C) . For comparison, we also t a logistic regression to each subject, but for no subject did it outperform our GP model (see Supplement Figure   9 ).
Disentangling identity and context eects in play
We next wanted to investigate how player strategy diered based on the identity of the opponent (human or computer). As Figure 2D illustrates some participants evinced minimal dierences in switch probability between the two opponents. However, this contrast elides an important distinction between what might be termed opponent identity eects and opponent context eects. That is, we might ask whether observed dierences in switch probability between the two opponents are due to intrinsic dierences in the way participants perceive each opponent or the fact that each opponent simply plays a dierent strategy. In typical social games, these eects are all but impossible to disentangle, but because we model the joint distribution of both states and opponent identity, f (s, ω), we can perform the following counterfactual experiment: For every state s visited in play against the computer (ω = 0), we can ask how f (s, 0) compares to f (s, 1). This is equivalent to freezing game play at a single moment, switching the identity of the opponent while holding all other variables xed, and asking how play in the next instant diers. Such a pure identity eect quanties how much participants' strategies would dier between human and computer opponents who used the same strategy.
In fact, the observed contrast between the two curves in Figure 2D can be fully decomposed into an eect due to opponent identity and an eect due to dierences in the distributions of visited states (see Methods). As indicated in Figure 3A , the observed contrast plotted in Figure 2D Thus, players can be distinguished not only by which opponent elicits more switching behavior, but also by the periods of the trial in which these tendencies occur.
Sensitivity to opponent actions diers between human and computer play
We next sought to quantify how much participants' switching behavior changed that such an approach is not only feasible, it produces a principled characterization of participants' behavior across multiple timescales. Indeed, when aggregated at the participant level, these indices fully characterize the policy model.
By analogy with the approach described in the last section, we dened one sensitivity for each input variable, equal to the square of the gradient along each input direction (see Methods). This yielded eight new sensitivity indices (seven for state plus one for opponent identity) in addition to the opponent action sensitivity dened above. However, our previous index can be dened in terms of these new indices, so there are only eight unique values in the set.
The most important feature of these new indices is that, like the policy, they are dened moment-by-moment, but can be aggregated across multiple levels of granularity, including trial and participant averages. We have already taken advantage of this in Fig 3D and Fig 4D to illustrate variance in switch probability and sensitivity across our population, but one can also approach this more systematically. As in classic analysis of variance (ANOVA), we can consider each index value at each data point as the sum of three terms:
a participant-level mean, a trial-level oset from this mean, and a residual specic to the data point. Likewise, we can use the data to estimate variances within trial (residual), across trials, and across our participant population.
As in ANOVA, the sum of these variances, appropriately weighted, equals the total variance in the data. Normalizing by this total variance yields a set of three positive terms that sums to 1: 
Action Value Model
We have shown that we can use nonparametric methods to estimate the policy participants use when playing a dynamic, strategic game. Yet this analysis says nothing about how eective these policies are. So how do participants' choices at each moment translate to wins and losses? To answer this, we separately modeled each participant's action value Q π (a|s, ω): the expected value of taking action a in state s against opponent ω and playing according to policy π thereafter. As indicated by notation, this value is policy-dependent. That is, each policy π uniquely determines a value function Q π . In typical reinforcement learning models, policies are likewise dependent on action values: Given action values, Q, policies choose actions based on a softmax function or other rule [20] . Thus, there is a mapping in the reverse direction from action values to policies. The Bellman Equation stipulates
that for optimal learners, the optimal policy and action values determine one another [20] , but this need not hold for nonoptimal learners. Figure 6A illustrates these concepts. While the optimal policy π * and Q * are mapped onto each other by the processes of value calculation and action selection, respectively, for non-optimal learners, the observed policy π obs leads to a value function Q obs , but softmax action selection based on Q obs may not be equivalent to the original policy: π Q = π obs , so the mappings in Figure 6A are not inverses except for optimal policies. In other words, learners may not necessarily be choosing based on the expected values of their actions. As a result, we took an approach in which the action value function Q(a|s, ω) was modeled independently of π: This model took as inputs the instantaneous state, opponent, and observed action at that time and attempted to predict from those data whether the participant subsequently won the trial. We used the same Gaussian Process classication approach as before, only this time predicting the trial outcome and using the participant's observed action as an additional input. Conversely, a set of action values, coupled with an action selection mechanism like softmax or greedy methods, determines a policy (leftward arrow). For optimal learners, the connection between the optimal policy π * and its resulting action values Q * is given by the Bellman Equation, which states that the leftward and rightward arrows are inverses of one another. For non-optimal agents, however, the observed policy π obs determines Q obs , but action selection based on Q obs may not be the same as π obs . The results of this model are shown in Figure 6 . As Figure 6B In fact, this trend can also be visualized in terms of the density of value as a function of time in trial (Fig 7) . Against the human opponent ( Fig 7A) , values start out concentrated around a player's mean win rate and evolve gradually over the course of the trial toward the 0 and 1 outcomes. By contrast, against the computer, values hold around 0.5 until abruptly diverging at the critical point. And indeed, this pattern holds in the average across all participants (Fig 7C,D) . Note that here, in the case of a computer opponent dened by a simple heuristic, our model is easily able to recover strong indications of that heuristic in an unbiased way. This indicates that our approach is powerful enough to characterize a wide range of behavior.
Circumstantially, it also suggests that our participants are unlikely to have relied on simple heuristics alone to constructing their strategies. Finally, to investigate how well expected value predicts whether a given trial will result in a win or loss, we conducted a series of univariate logistic regressions. Given an opponent and an average expected value in the early, middle, or late periods of each trial, we attempted to predict the trial's result. We found that regression coecients for the human opponent condition were higher than those for the computer opponent (t = 4.53, p < 0.0001), suggesting that (unrealized) expected values better predict trial outcome in the human opponent condition. Second, we found that regression coecients increase as the trial progresses, such that the late coecients were signicantly higher than early coecients (t = 30.69, p < 0.0001). This matches our intuition that trial outcomes are better predicted by expected values later in the trial (see Supplement Figure 11 ).
Discussion
Increasing interest in dynamic social interactions has necessitated a commensurate increase in the complexity of behavioral studies, but the methods used to analyze these new paradigms often lack the exibility to handle the data produced. Here, we have shown that Gaussian Processes, a well-studied class of Bayesian nonparametric models, make it possible both to t complex behavioral strategies and to forge links with the literature on reinforcement learning. As a result, our work is related to ideas in inverse reinforcement learning [4446] , which seeks to estimate, rather than learn, policies and value functions capable of generating observed behavior. Moreover, it is in keeping with a recent surge of interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems [4750], though those contexts are typically cooperative rather than competitive. Finally, our problem can be viewed as a limit of the game theory context in which decisions take place simultaneously in continuous time [14, 50] . Our work stands to complement those results by focusing on the out-of-equilibrium dynamics that lead up to players' nal moves. This emphasis on the dynamic coupling of agents also works to bring us closer to real-world social interactions, in which decisions are based on coevolving exchanges.
There are several strengths to recommend our computational modeling framework. First, Bayesian estimation of continuous policy and value functions results in principled measures of uncertainty [28] . The resulting statistical inferences about individuals and populations are thus better indicators of model t than point estimates obtained from maximum likelihood methods.
Second, dierentiability of policies and value functions allows us to derive sensitivity estimates that quantify the coupling between agents, which we have shown can characterize individual dierences in play on a variety of time scales. Third, modeling the joint distribution of both players allows us to perform counterfactual analyses that dissociate the eects of player identity from those of game contextan intractable problem for most competing approaches [14] . Finally, dissociating policy and action value functions allows us to consider observed behavior without either assuming optimality or being able to calculate what optimal behavior should be [20, 51] .
Importantly, our approach is not limited to a specic task. It generalizes readily to more than two agents, both cooperative and competitive contexts, and a wide variety of reward structures. All of these variants can be captured by simply enlarging the state space to accommodate the additional variables characterizing each agent. Likewise, our data need not have been sampled densely or even at regular intervals, since Gaussian Processes have proven hugely inuential in elds like ecology [36] and health data [41] where sparse observations are the norm. But our method is likely to prove most valuable for examinations of decision making in natural settings like shopping, foraging, or web browsing, where the number of covariates is large and the number of events (purchases, food items, clicks) is comparatively small. Yet our specic application does yield insights into humans' dynamic strategic adjustments: We found that while participants exhibited a wide variety of behavioral strategies, most dierences in play between human and computer opponents could be attributed to context eects, not opponent identity. That is, to rst order, participants used the same approach against both opponents. Their resulting win rates depended primarily on how the opponent's strategy interacted with their own. Nonetheless, opponent effects were present transiently at critical periods in each trial, during which the probability of a switch increased, as did the sensitivity of participants' strategies to the opponent's actions. In fact, comparing these opponent effects during the rst and last half of each trial revealed a gradient of opponent coupling across our participant population (Fig 3D, Fig 4D) .
The importance of these policy-derived metrics, particularly the sensitivities, is consistent with the ndings of many groups that an ability to model the thoughts and intentions of another agent, particularly in competitive contexts, plays a central role in human social interaction [7, 5254] . For our task, in which within-trial dynamics are more variable than across-trial changes in strategy, an analysis of variance showed that most sensitivities were best characterized as instantaneous measures, but a few, including the baseline probability of switching and our sensitivity to opponent action metric, were relatively more trait-like, consistent with the idea that the underlying variability in our participant population is not in strategic heuristics but in the degree to which players' actions are coupled to one another. This decomposition of variance for continuous, task-related predictors can be used in future studies for systematically determining whether a given covariate characterizes a trait-like or state-like process, which is particularly important when investigating individual dierences in the social sciences.
Finally, we showed that an analysis of participants' evolving prospects of winning easily distinguished between the track-then-guess heuristic of the computer opponent and the more complex human opponents. Such an analysis allows us not only to assess the degree to which a given moment in the trial is critical to a player's future prospects (the dierence in action values should be large in those cases), but how successful players are in seizing these opportunities as they arise. In our case, we were unsurprised to nd that moves made early on had only a modest eect on eventual wins: failure to exploit early opportunities did not necessarily ordain a loss. This is a result of the fact that action values are functions of both players' strategies, and so situations arose in which the opponent's strategy was so misguided that any move by the participant increased expected value.
Perhaps most important for studies of social and decision neuroscience, our models suggest a natural set of variables of interest at a hierarchy of temporal scales. While the policies and action values we derive oer instantaneous regressors at the tens of milliseconds resolution of electrophysiology, including EEG, MEG, and ECoG, these metrics can also be averaged at the trial and participant level for use with fMRI and PET. Providing computational frameworks for capturing complex temporal dynamics is crucial in learning and decision making [20, 55, 56] . The key advantage of our approach lies in an ability to identify both behavioral tipping points (high sensitivity of policy) and reward tipping points (large dierences in action value) and distinguish between the two. This is particularly crucial in the analysis of neural data, where one wishes to designate dierent types of cognitive events in addition to observational events (i.e. shifts in probability of winning without changes in action, or changes of mind) [57, 58] . Thus, taken together, our results and overall approach oer a new path to the use of more complex and naturalistic paradigms in the study and modeling of social interaction. 
Materials and methods
Gaussian Process Model Fitting Traditionally, performing full Bayesian inference in Gaussian processes has been prohibitive, with computation scaling as O(N 3 ), with N the number of training data points. However, recent advances in approximate inference methods based on sparse collections of M N inducing points have reduced this cost to O(N M 2 ), making computation feasible for large data sets [29, 30, 42] . Here, we used GPFlow, a Gaussian process package based on the TensorFlow machine learning library, to t separate Gaussian process classication models to data from each experimental participant [59] . Models were t using the Sparse Variational Gaussian Process algorithm coded in GPFlow, using input variables as described in the text. We used 500 inducing points and trained for 200,000 iterations using the Adam optimizer [42, 59, 60] for both the policy and action value models. Altering these parameters did not materially change either the tted GPs or their sensitivities (see Supplement Figure 12,13 ). Model hyperparameters were learned during the training run, an empirical Bayes approach [35] . We used a train/test split of 80/20% to evaluate each model's performance; test data were not used to select model parameters.
Identity and Context Decomposition
Because we use a generative model to predict change points as a function of both game state and opponent, for any given game state, we are able to generate counterfactual predictions by providing data that were not directly observed directly in our experiment. For example, by providing the actual game state s for a particular moment but switching the opponent label from computer to human, we are able to predict would have happened had the participant been placed in the same game conguration against a dierent opponent. This allows us to assess to what degree observed dierences between opponents are due to the distribution of visited game states s and which are due to the opponent identity ω. More formally, dene:
be an expectation of some random variable X (for instance, a probability of switching or sensitivity). Here again, s represents the game state and ω the opponent identity (0 = computer, 1 = human), but we decouple the opponent specied in the random variable from the opponent that generated the states over which we average. More concretely, X 00 denotes the value of X against the computer, averaged over states actually played against the computer, while X 10 again denotes the value of X against the computer, only this time averaged over states played against the human. In this notation, Fig 2D plots X 00 and X 11 with X = Φ −1 (p), while Fig 4 shows the same two variables with X equal to our opponent sensitivity metric.
What is most important, however, is that the observed contrast plotted in purple in Fig 3B-C can be decomposed as a weighted sum of the identity eect C identity and the context eect C identity , as follows:
C context ≡ 1 2 E p(s|ω=1) X(s, 1) − E p(s|ω=0) X(s, 1) + E p(s|ω=1) X(s, 0) − E p(s|ω=0) X(s, 0) = 1 2 X 11 − X 01 + 1 2 X 10 − X 00 (15) C observed ≡ X 11 − X 00 ≈ C identity + C context
with n 0 and n 1 the number of trials played against the computer and human opponents, respectively, N = n 0 + n 1 , and approximate equality holds in Eq 16 because n 0 ≈ n 1 in our data.
Sensitivity metrics
To capture the eect of small changes of input variables on our latent Gaussian Process f , we a dened sensitivity for each input variable as the (squared) norm of the GP gradient along that direction:
with i = 1 . . . 8 indexing each predictor variable in (s, ω) and σ i the local uncertainty in ∇ i f . This can be motivated by noting that since f is a GP, ∇f is as well (see Supplement Note 2). Dividing a collection of squared Gaussian variables (one per observation) by their standard deviations results in a set of χ 2 variables. Viewed another way, by normalizing by the uncertainty σ i , we are downweighting highly uncertain gradients in our sensitivity measure (see Supplement Note 4).
When we consider a total sensitivity to opponent actions, we combine sensitivities to opponent action and velocity into a single metric:
where ς is the opponent sensitivity metric,x ≡ (y opponent , v opponent ) and L is the Cholesky factor of the covariance of ∇xf (LL T = Σ x ). This is equivalent to combining the gradients for opponent position and velocity by rst performing a PCA on these two coordinates and weighting each principal component equally in the calculation. As with the ν i above, it can be shown that this index has a known distribution (noncentral χ 2 ), allowing us to calculate uncertainty in the action sensitivity metric at each time point (see Supplement Note 4).
